We combine post-displacement survey data with information from personnel files of a displacing firm in order to reveal sources of worker heterogeneity in search time and wage losses. The Fokker Personnel Files and Survey are described in detail. We develop a dynamic reservation wage with updating. The method of updating is based on the simple idea that job seekers are informed about successful matches of their former colleagues similar to them. The data offer empirical support for the updating model.
Introduction
In this study, we analyze the effects of displacement for workers from a single large firm in The Netherlands. 1 Because of the firm's bankruptcy, all workers are officially informed about their layoff at the same date. The data we use contain detailed information on the accumulated human capital in relation to the occupation held and the career developed within the firm. Together with the workers' hierarchical positions, their job characteristics, job rotations, and promotions, we are able to thoroughly investigate the displacement process. Using a post-displacement survey, we combine workers' pre-displacement occupational and career characteristics with specific information on the search process and the eventual new job characteristics.
The combination of detailed pre-and post-displacement information of job characteristics, wages, and search history allows us to develop and estimate a simple model of dynamic updating of idiosyncratic asking wages or reservation wages. The updating is a product of learning from information about successful matches obtained by former colleagues with similar characteristics. The idea is based on the observation that after the bankruptcy many former employees became members of clubs where people met regularly (see also Granovetter 1974; Rees 1966 ). The updating model is strongly supported by the data.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the data, including the development of the post-displacement survey. In Section 3 we propose a dynamic updating model to perform an integrated analysis of search time and wage losses. In Section 4 we discuss the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
The displaced worker survey and personnel data
After more than three quarters of a century in aircraft production the Dutch company Fokker went bankrupt. Founded by one of the pioneers of aviation and aircraft design, Anthony Fokker, the company first blossomed in the 1920s when it became the world leader in aircraft construction, producing in both The Netherlands and the United States. After the destruction of its production facilities during the Second World War, Fokker remained one of the smaller players in the world aircraft industry, producing predominantly civilian mid-range airplanes of 50-100 seats. In March 1996 the company filed for bankruptcy and 5,644 workers lost their tenured jobs.
To salvage viable parts of the company the bankruptcy trustees created a new company, called Fokker Aviation. A total of 953 workers were simultaneously made redundant from the bankrupt firm and rehired by Fokker Aviation.
2 Another group of 700 workers was offered a contract to continue working for the trustees to finish off outstanding aircraft orders. All remaining 3,991 workers were permanently displaced. In 1998 we obtained access to the personnel files of the bankrupt company for the years 1987-1996, and gained the support of the bankruptcy trustees to survey the displaced workers.
The 'Fokker survey'
To recover the work history of the workers after their displacement, a survey was conducted. The survey was conducted to cover some information missing from the otherwise rich personnel data of the company (with detailed information on the search process, the first employment after displacement, the employer 3 years after displacement, the new function, salary, and employment conditions).
The questionnaire was developed and tested using focus group meetings among a selected group of displaced workers who were subsequently excluded from the survey. In total 38 workers participated in some form with the development or pre-testing of the survey instrument. In addition, we sent the full instrument with the intended accompanying letters to 100 randomly selected workers as a pilot of the survey.
Given the breadth of functions within the company, the decision was taken to send the survey to all displaced workers, taking a census rather than a sample of the population. Current addresses of the respondents were obtained from the bankruptcy trustees. Information from the Fokker Pension Fund was used to check upon deceased employees. The addresses of deceased former employees were omitted from the address files used for the survey. All workers received the survey with pre-stamped return envelopes, with one repeat. Some 2,279 workers responded. In following up 100 randomly selected non-respondents, it was found that their labor force status did not deviate significantly from that of our respondents. The information from the mailsurvey has been linked to the information from the personnel files.
The mail-survey consisted of a 14-page questionnaire, pertaining to the individual's labor market history in the 3 years following the displacement event. A respondent needed approximately 30 min to complete the questionnaire, excluding additional time needed to search for precise information. Table 1 gives the composition of the workforce which were part of the survey population. The questionnaire was sent out in April 1999 to all 5,506 workers in the survey population (see Table 1 ). As noted, 2,279 ex-Fokker workers returned completed questionnaires yielding a response rate of 41.4%. In Table 1 Composition of Fokker workforce and survey population at the time of the bankruptcy Number (N) P e r c e n t ( % ) Appendix A, we report results of the non-response analysis. The survey results are of high quality for a self-administered mail survey. We could validate some of the given information by comparing the reported salary earned with Fokker to the information available from the administrative files. Many respondents were able to fill in the exact amount of gross monthly salary which they earned 3 years prior to the survey. In a validation study for the PSID, Bound et al. (1994) also find reported wages to be rather accurate on average. The mean error of log earnings found in this study was 0.007, which closely approximates that reported in the present paper (viz. 0.006). Similarly, the standard deviation of our sample is 0.34, which is only slightly higher than the standard deviation of 0.32 reported in the PSID study. The survey asked for information on the first and the current job. Respondents reported the date at which they started to work in the new position, their starting wage and hours worked. Information was also collected on the type of the new firm (e.g. name, industry, size). We categorize new employers as belonging to the aircraft industry, other manufacturing industries, or nonmanufacturing. The respondents were asked to assess their responsibility in their new job compared to that before displacement. On a five-point scale, the middle category reflecting a similar level of responsibility, they could indicate 'more,' and 'much more' responsibility on the one hand, or 'less' and 'much less' on the other hand. Furthermore, we collected information on the prerequisites for the new job, as perceived by the respondent. The response categories were fourfold: both the work experience and the technical knowledge obtained while working at Fokker were necessary to obtain the new job; either the work experience alone or the technical knowledge alone was necessary to gain reemployment; neither category was strictly necessary; and finally, neither category was at all necessary.
The personnel data
From Fokker's personnel files we obtained information on each employee's type of job, compensation, and demographics. Demographic characteristics include date of birth, gender, education, marital status, and the hiring date of each employee. The average tenure at the time of bankruptcy was 15 years. The firm's hierarchy distinguishes eight different levels below top management. The highest observable step, the eighth level, is just below the top management and the Board of Directors. For reasons of possible identification, the two upper levels (9 and 10) were left out of the data-set.
The hierarchical structure roughly reflects the division of unskilled versus skilled workers as well as the organization of supervision. Production workers are located in levels 1-3. Managers, engineers, and aircraft designers belong to levels 4-8.
3 Every position is 'allocated' to a job activity. These activities are Administration; Sales; Management; Human Resources; R&D; Production Preparation; Production Planning; Support; Production; and Quality Control.
Job rotation is defined as the number of lateral job changes within a given hierarchical level. The lateral job change is a movement across job activities without changing the hierarchical position to a higher (or lower) level job. In addition to the normal tenure variable, we observe tenure within the hierarchy and tenure within a specific position (job). The latter two tenure variables were measured in months rather than years for the last position held before layoff.
We have calculated the unemployment insurance (UI) benefits paid to the worker, as well as the duration for which they were eligible. These calculations were according to the Dutch regulations: On the day of the bankruptcy every worker faces a 6-week firing period in which they receive their salary. Older workers are entitled to a longer firing period. The original 6 weeks are extended by 1 week per year of tenure if the worker was older than 45 years. The maximum firing period after a bankruptcy is 19 weeks. After the firing period workers receive unemployment insurance benefits. The unemployment insurance pays 70% of the former salary up to a maximum of 55,000 Dutch guilders. This implies a replacement ratio of 0.7 for all workers receiving less than 78,752 Dutch guilders annually. Sixteen percent of our sample received annual salaries above this amount leading to lower replacement ratios for those workers. The length of the UI payments depends on the labor market experience of the worker. A worker is entitled to UI payments if he has worked 4 out of the 5 years prior to becoming unemployed. Workers who worked for 4 years are entitled to 6 months of UI payments. After 5 years worked, this rises to a total of 9 months, and to a total of 12 months after 10 years worked. Beyond 10 years of labor market experience a workers' entitlement increases by an additional 6-month for every additional 5 years he worked. The maximum entitlement is 60 months.
We use the 1993-1996 residuals of an unrestricted regression of the wage growth as a proxy of the distribution of idiosyncratic worker ability at the time of the mass layoff.
5 If this measure is indeed a good proxy for unobserved ability we expect it to be negatively correlated with search time.
3 Updating the reservation wage over time Table 2 shows the evolution of the nominal wages of observed matches after the bankruptcy. It reflects the downward sloping relation so often portrayed in the search literature, and thought to result from the endogenous interaction between search, duration of UI, adaptation of reservation wages, and hyperbolic discounting by the individual worker (Postel-Vinay and Robin 2002) . How the adaptation of the reservation wage over time actually takes place is The first three time periods refer to a 3-month period. The last period refers to the period September 1998 until 01.04.1999, when the survey was conducted. The first column gives the pool of workers who are still unemployed (the risk-set) at the beginning of the period, the second column gives the number of matches during the time period, and the last column gives the average wage of the realized matches in the period.
not well explained in the literature. Although often referred to as 'learning' and modelled as a stochastic process accordingly, it remains unclear how updating of the reservation wage actually occurs. Many view the adaptation process as random, while some say it depends on individual wealth (Bloemen and Stancanelli 2001) . Randomness is often assumed to result from trial and error. In fact, for this to work a job-seeker needs the input of a large sequence of job-interviews. But invitations for interviews are rare, and once invited for an interview the rejection probability is remarkably low: in our population of workers 26.75% receive an offer which is rejected, and most of those workers have received multiple offers around the same time. If anything, the process should be one that is based on-often unobserved-unsuccessful applications that determine the reduction of reservation wages over time until a successful match is found. Workers are at the point of displacement unsure about the wage offer distribution that is available to them. Often they have high tenure and do not orient themselves on the labor market. According to standard search theory, however, workers set their reservation wage by optimizing over wage offers they expect to elicit combined with the duration expected to take for such an offer to arrive. If workers do not have precise knowledge about the distribution of prevailing wages, a learning process could be assumed (Burdett and Vishwanath 1988 ).
We propose a somewhat different and to our view more realistic method of updating. Not only are workers updating their reservation wage because of their own learning process over the prevailing wages as in Burdett and Vishwanath (1988) , but they also take into account the experience of their former colleagues. Our method is based on the observation that after the bankruptcy many former employees became or remained member of clubs where former workers of Fokker meet regularly. Most of these clubs have a recreational purpose-we counted 14 different clubs, varying from a bowling club to a yoga club-and two more general interest organizations that are responsible for the clubs' activities. These are the 'Association of Former Fokker Employees,' with 2,000 members, and the 'Community of Interests of Ex-Employees of Fokker,' that had 1,100 members at the time we conducted the survey. Thus our assumption is the following: Rather than basing the consideration of when and by how much to adjust your reservation wage on individual experiences alone, we suggest that people in these clubs and organizations are informed about the successes and failures of people similar to themselves and that this information is used for updating. Even though we do not have information on who was a member and how often people met, we do observe for every worker in the sample the characteristics of successful matches. The process of peer updating is modeled in the following way:
Each updating process needs time. We call this a period, and we assume that periods have similar lengths for all individuals. The risk set during each period consists of all workers who are job-seekers at the beginning of the period, N t . A peer is defined as a worker with observable characteristics, X it , being similar to job-seeker i in period t. M t > 0 workers find jobs during period t. Their matched wages and wage losses are observed by all other workers, and the wages of recently matched colleagues may be standing in for unobserved variations in local labor market conditions. At the beginning of each consecutive period the risk set has been reduced to N t+1 = N t − M t . In the first period, the relative reservation wage of worker i is computed as:
where W i1 is the last wage earned before displacement, andW −i1 is the average of all last wages earned by the other workers subject to displacement from the same firm. In period t > 1, we order all job-seekers in the previous period t − 1 according to the observed successes in finding a job during that period, starting with the successful ones. DefineŴ jt−1 as the observed matched wage in period t − 1 by the individual successful worker j, j ∈ [1, M t−1 ]. Define W * it as the expected wage at the beginning of period t that would have been obtained by worker i, i ∈ [M t−1 + 1, N t ] if a successful match is believed -by the job-seeker -to be independent of unobservable ability differences between fortunate workers and unfortunate job-seekers with similar characteristics, that is if matches would be thought of as strictly random among peers. We have
To calculate RW it we need to specify how to obtain estimates for Pr(
The first component is estimated as a simple Probit model of observed successful matches (I t−1 = 1) and unsuccessful workers (I t−1 = 0) during period t − 1 given X it . The assumed randomness of successful matches among peers allows us to compute the simple OLS regression of observed matches on characteristics X jt , and use the estimated coefficients to compute the predicted wage E[Ŵ it−1 |X it ]. Finally, we assume linearity for the functional form f t (·), so that
The parameters λ t will be estimated using a piecewise-constant hazard model suggested by Lancaster (1990) including the correction for heterogeneity as suggested by Murphy (1996) . The likelihood function for this model is given in Appendix B.
Estimation results
We find that the time support points are strongly significant which indicates that the hazard of leaving unemployment differs over the five-time periods. Within the exponential-hazard model, the hazard itself is constant per time period, while the support points allow the per period to differ. Table 3 gives the estimation results. The relative wage position -which we use to estimate the effect of learning on the reservation wage -is strongly significant in the second and third time period. It shows that in this period a worker faces different hazards according to his relative wage position of the group. All else equal they point to longer search for higher expected wages. This confirms the idea that workers learn over time and observe the matches of their co-workers rather than trying to learn from their labor market failures alone. Based on matches of their co-workers they extrapolate their chances of finding a job and the market valuation of their skills. For the first, fourth and fifth time period no significant distinction can be made. Hence, learning will not be important in these time periods. Intuitively one should consider that t1 to t5 represent the time specific intercepts. Age is at the time of displacement. We also correct for field of activity within the displacing firm, the tenure in the field of activity as well as in the specific job, lateral movements across activities and gender. knowing one's position within the wage distribution, and knowing the wage distribution allows the worker to optimally accept or decline wage offers. If however, the position in the wage distribution, or the real wage distribution is blurred, workers will not be able to make optimal decisions. The learning in period two and three can also be understood by looking at Fig. 1 . The first row gives the distribution of the predicted chance that a worker will find new employment based on the observed matches of the previous period of his former colleagues. The second row presents the distribution of expected (log) wages also based on observed matches of former colleagues. The probability of employment times the expected wages-the third row-is the distribution of expected reservation wages. Note that the distribution is dispersed in the second time period, while it gets more concentrated in the later time periods. In addition to the results on the importance of learning, or the relative wage position in the expected wages, we also find that higher hierarchical levels have shorter search time. This is intuitive as workers who are working in higher hierarchies usually have both more exposure to the working environment and also survived an internal career selection, indicating that they are productive workers. In a similar fashion, on a lower level, do the evaluations a worker received before displacement indicate that workers who were excelling in their position, or were evaluated to be 'Very Good' also perform better in finding new employment, relative to average workers. Symmetrically, workers who were evaluated as functioning poorly show a strong negative sign, implying that they face longer search time. A similar factor is 'WAO', which gives an individual worker's previous (partial) work disability as a percentage of full time equivalents. 6 Workers who have been partially disabled to work show longer search time.
Age and tenure show the expected signs in that older, higher tenured workers search longer after displacement. The weeks of unemployment insurance also follow the expected pattern: the closer the individual is to benefit expiration, the higher the reemployment hazard. 
Conclusion
We combined survey data from displaced workers and their personnel records from a bankrupt firm to investigate post-displacement differences in search time. We propose a dynamic reservation wage model with updating. The method of updating is based on the simple idea that job seekers are informed about successful matches of their former colleagues. Allowing workers to learn from the labor market experience of their former co-workers and peers, they are basing their search strategy on matching results observed of workers similar to them. We find this information to be an important explanation of the simultaneous dynamics of reservation wages and observed unemployment durations. Search time increases with age and tenure. Workers with a higher hierarchical position search significantly less than do lower level workers, while the length of remaining UI negatively affects search.
Similar workers who found high wage jobs increase the unemployed peer worker's reservation wage as well as the predicted search time. Learning is strong in situations in which the relative wage position can be easily identified with some confidence. we used weighted as well as unweighted estimations using information of nonrespondents from the personnel files. The idea of asking a limited number of core questions for a follow up, was first suggested by Bethlehem and Kersten (1986) as a method of distinguishing between the group of non-respondents who are simply unwilling to provide the detailed answers asked for in general or specific surveys, and those unwilling to participate for reasons related to the survey specifically. To learn about possible non-random selection a limited number of core questions were asked to non-respondents by means of telephone interviews. Given the information we already had about the respondents and non-respondents from the personnel files, the core questions should be sufficient for identifying non-response bias. In Table A .1 the results are given from the non-response follow up. We find that the labor market status is comparable between the respondents and the non-respondents. We conclude that the non-response is randomly distributed with respect to (un)employment status. The second test examines the effects of known variables of both respondents and non-respondents on the probability of response. To identify the compositional differences between respondents and non-respondents we used a simple Probit including all variables from the personnel files to examine the differences between the respondents and the non-respondents. Having predicted a probability of survey response allowed us to post-stratify the sample outcomes with the inverse of the individual's response probability.
From the core question approach we concluded that the group of nonrespondents seems to match the group of respondents with respect to the labor market status. The additional examination of non-response behavior showed that some variables 8 significantly predicted non-response. This implies that non-response was not random. As the weighted estimation differ very little from the unweighted ones, we report the unweighted results only.
We can then write the total log likelihood by summing over all N observations.
